TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/052989/05298900.067

Text File | 1992-09-23 | 10.0 KB | 203 lines

                                                                                INTERVIEW, Page 78

Keep the Powder Dry


General JOHN GALVIN, NATO commander, counters Gorbachev's P.R.
offensive with hard facts about the Soviet military

By Michael Kramer, John Galvin


    Q. Is the West witnessing a true perestroika, or
restructuring of the Soviet system, with a diminished desire for
expansion, or merely a peredyshka, a breathing space, during
which Moscow wants to rebuild its economic might without any
real change in its long-term geopolitical objectives?

    A. I agree the words are sweet, but there are a number of
significant anomalies. There is a lot of dissonance between
what they say, which seems to have captured everyone's
imagination in the belief that the cold war is over, and what
is actually being done. For example, Mikhail Gorbachev talks
about withdrawing 10,000 tanks, but Soviet tank production is
very high. They're now producing about 3,000 tanks a year -- far
better tanks, by the way, than anything they are talking about
removing. Consider what just this one indicator means. They say,
and I agree after having studied it, that it will take them
about two years to pull back the 10,000 tanks in an orderly
fashion. By then they will have added at least 6,000 newer ones.
It is certainly strange that their tank production is so high
when they already have such a superiority relative to the
allies. Recall too that this increase in tank production is
occurring when Gorbachev says he's cutting military expenditures
in order to deal with domestic needs. Taken alone, this evidence
could compel you to throw up your hands, say Gorbachev isn't
serious and walk away. But it is possible that Gorbachev has
simply changed so many variables already, like retiring the old
marshals and permitting civilian think tanks to comment on
military strategy, that production is an area he simply hasn't
got around to yet.

    On the other hand, maybe he wants to delay dealing with
armaments production till he feels more confident about his
control over the military. The Soviet sale of bombers to Libya
is another action that makes no sense when compared to
Gorbachev's rhetoric. The fact that one has to weigh and wonder
about all this means that we have to keep our powder dry and not
rush into big reductions when the jury is still out.

    Meanwhile, the problem of Western euphoria over Gorbachev
is complicated by Moscow's having been particularly clever in
its understanding of the public relations value of unilateral
announcements -- something the West has yet to learn. When the
Soviets make unilateral announcements, Moscow reaps a
tremendous p.r. benefit, and I'm left with the reality --
continued huge Soviet military capabilities. It's difficult to
get the public to realize that unilateral pronouncements
uncodified by treaty are easy to turn around, as are intentions
generally. I'm routinely criticized for a supposedly overly
simplistic insistence on assessing capabilities rather than
intentions. Well, we hope Gorbachev means what he says, but if
he changes his mind and we have reduced our own military
strength on the basis of a rhetoric of intentions when his
capabilities haven't really changed much at all, then we could
be in big trouble fast.

    Q. But Gorbachev has now offered to reduce the Warsaw
Pact's conventional forces essentially to parity with NATO's.
Isn't that what we've always wanted?

    A. It depends on the fine print and on what becomes of our
nuclear capability in the process. A parity of conventional
forces has never meant peace in Europe.

    And even if an agreement on conventional parity does come
off, we need to know the nature of the forces that would be
left. The tank-production anomaly, for instance, indicates that
we'd face a leaner but meaner Warsaw Pact force when all is said
and done.

    Q. Assume that a parity satisfactory to you is finally
achieved. At that point, would you be willing to denuclearize
Europe, as the Soviets and many Europeans want?

    A. No. I don't want to see us ever do away with our nuclear
capability in Europe. My No. 1 mission is to deter war, not
simply win one. For 500 years, every European generation has had
to learn anew about war. Now, for four decades we haven't had
one here. I don't think it's a coincidence that this period has
coincided with the nuclear age.

    The logic for nuclear weapons in Europe has always been
twofold. First, they have compensated for the
conventional-force imbalance between the alliance and the Soviet
bloc. Second, and more important, they are a deterrent. They
raise the level of uncertainty in the mind of a potential
aggressor. He has to consider that the cost of war may be too
high. It's the element of unpredictability of what might happen
in a nuclear exchange that keeps war from happening. So
regardless of whether we can ever get conventional-force parity,
I believe nuclear weapons have an indispensable peacekeeping
value irrespective of the conventional balance.

    Q. The West Germans say they believe in the value of a
nuclear deterrent, but they want to negotiate with the Soviets
on the short-range nuclear force (SNF) right away. What's wrong
with that?

    A. The problem is that the result of a negotiation might be
different. We could be railroaded into something we don't want
to do, which is to wipe out all nuclear weapons in Europe, the
so-called third zero.

    While it's true that the Soviets have more short-range
nuclear weapons -- and that they've modernized their short-range
missiles while we are still relying on our old Lance, we
nevertheless have a sufficient capability to create that crucial
uncertainty in their mind regarding a war's outcome. I don't
want to risk a run to zero by opening up a negotiation in the
current climate.

    Q. Some who are sensitive to the internal German political
situation, like Senator Sam Nunn, are urging that the West
indulge the Germans' desire for immediate SNF talks, but would
mandate that whatever nuclear agreement is reached not be
implemented until the conventional-force agreement is carried
out. Isn't that an acceptable compromise?

    A. I admit it sounds fine. But, again, there is so much
uncertainty about everything now that I wouldn't want to risk
that kind of tied-together negotiation's running away from us
to a third zero.

    Q. If European opinion demands no ground-based nukes at all
on European soil, NATO would still have substantial air and sea
nuclear capability. Wouldn't they be sufficient?

    A. Theater nuclear forces were put in Europe in the first
place because Europeans didn't find it credible that the U.S.
would come to their defense with nuclear strikes if only Europe
were in danger of being overrun in a conventional war. Putting
the nuclear capability to sea would not only be returning toward
the discredited massive-retaliation doctrine, it would also mean
that most if not all of the capability would be in the hands of
the U.S. and Britain, which would probably cause the continental
nations to again wonder if their allies would use these weapons
if it became necessary. Also, the Soviets have a superior
air-defense capability, and the alliance has relatively few
airfields. It is therefore possible that in the Soviet
military's mind, the Warsaw Pact could suppress a nuclear strike
from NATO aircraft and thus lower the cost factor sufficiently
so that they might conclude they could win a war in Europe that
would be worth winning. That's why having nuclear missiles in
Europe is essential to the overall mix.

    Q. NATO only has 88 Lance short-range nuclear-capable
missile launchers. The U.S. and Britain want to modernize them.
Germany and most of the other NATO nations are against
modernization. Since the Lances are mainly on German soil, why
shouldn't their view prevail?

    A. The Lance will be dead by 1995 unless is it is
modernized. There is such a thing as electronic rust. That means
that by '95 you could fire a Lance without enough assurance that
it wouldn't be a dud. Increasing the range should be appealing
to everyone, including the Germans. That means we could move the
missiles back from the front lines. Increasing the Lance's range
would give us more territory in which to hide them, thus making
the deterrent safer, and it would give us greater flexibility
about actually using them. The farther back, the more likely the
missiles will survive until you need them. But we have to be
careful not to push the Germans. At this point, we have the
luxury of being in the research stage and of not having to push
anyone on the deployment question at a time when their circuits
are overloaded. My view is that we shouldn't force answers to
questions before we have to ask them.

    Q. But what happens to the NATO strategies of forward
defense and flexible response if there is no Lance at all?

    A. Forward defense is the strategy the alliance wants. It
is a militarily feasible strategy, but, of course, it is not
the classic defensive strategy. The classic defense is one that
is mobile, trading space for time. We don't have the space to
pull back, so we rely on nuclear weapons. But in a Lance-less
world, we might have to relook the strategy. The risks would
increase greatly simply because we would have lessened the
nuclear capability available for deterrence purposes. I for one
would not like to operate at that level of risk, and I don't
think the alliance would find it very satisfactory over the long
run.

    Q. What if the European environment changes so radically
that there are no longer any nuclear weapons on the Continent
at all? Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said it would be almost
impossible to keep 326,000 U.S. forces in a denuclearized
Europe. As the saying goes, "No nukes, no troops." Do you agree
with Cheney?

    A. First of all, it was the U.S. Secretary of Defense who
said that -- and I might add that his predecessor said the same
thing -- and it seems to me that people have got to take that
into serious consideration.